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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 14-4261 
 ___________ 
 
THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, and its various property casualty 
affilliates and subsidiaries; TRAVELERS CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY, and its 
various property casualty affilliates and subsidiaries; ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and its various property casualty affilliates and subsidiaries; 
THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,  
and its various property casualty affilliates and subsidiaries, 
            Appellants 
 
v. 
 
CEPHALON, INC.; TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.; TEVA 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LIMITED; ABC CORPORATIONS 1 
THROUGH 5; FICTITIOUS NAMES 
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-12-cv-04191) 
District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 14, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  August 10, 2015) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff-Appellants (“Plaintiffs”), several workers’ compensation insurance 
providers, are Travelers Indemnity Company, Travelers Casualty & Surety Company, St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, and the Standard Fire Insurance Company.  
Defendant-Appellees (“Defendants”) are Cephalon, Inc., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Inc., and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.1  Plaintiffs brought claims against 
Defendants for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, violations of 
state consumer protection laws, and unjust enrichment, and seek damages and an 
injunction.   
 The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  
Because Plaintiffs have failed to set out their fraud claims with sufficient specificity 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and have failed to plead the necessary 
elements under Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. 
                                                            
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 Plaintiffs do not address the District Court’s dismissal of claims against Teva USA and 
Teva Ltd. in their opening brief.  Thus, any argument with respect to those Defendants is 
waived.  See In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003).     
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Ann. §§ 42-110a, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim.  
Plaintiffs also appeal the District Court’s denial of their motion to amend the judgment of 
dismissal and for leave to file an amended complaint.  We will affirm that denial because 
amendment would have been futile.       
I. BACKGROUND 
 Actiq and Fentora are powerful painkillers approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) to manage breakthrough pain in cancer patients who were 
already receiving and were tolerant to opioid pain medications.  Both Actiq and Fentora 
include warning labels indicating that they are only for the treatment of persistent cancer 
pain in patients who are tolerant to opioid therapy, and that they are contraindicated for 
acute or post-operative pain management in opioid non-tolerant patients.  Plaintiffs allege 
that Cephalon marketed Actiq and Fentora for off-label uses, specifically by promoting 
these medications to doctors for use in non-cancer patients for the treatment of non-
cancer pain.  Plaintiffs allege that Cephalon’s marketing “goes beyond mere off-label 
promotion of Actiq [and Fentora] and includes untruthful, factually inaccurate, 
incomplete and/or otherwise misleading promotion of the drug[s], and the promotion of 
Actiq [and Fentora] for contraindicated uses.”  (Am. Compl. ¶ 80.)   Plaintiffs also allege 
that they and their claimants spent more than $18 million on Actiq and Fentora since 
2004.  Plaintiffs provide illustrative examples of claimants who were prescribed Actiq 
and Fentora for off-label uses and the amount of money Plaintiffs paid for the 
medications prescribed in these examples.  However, Plaintiffs do not allege that they or 
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their claimants heard or relied on fraudulent statements or misrepresentations.  Rather, 
they allege that Cephalon directed its off-label marketing at doctors treating claimants 
whose claims would be reimbursed by Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs identify five doctors who 
prescribed Fentora to Plaintiffs’ claimants and who also “received payments/benefits 
from Cephalon” during the same time period.  (Am. Compl. ¶ 162.)  Plaintiffs also 
identify one claimant who received Actiq prescriptions from a doctor who attended “field 
rides” with Cephalon representatives, Am. Compl. ¶ 94, though Plaintiffs allege neither 
that this doctor received payments or benefits from Cephalon, nor that misleading or 
fraudulent information was provided or relied upon. 
 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 301, et seq., 
“regulates the manufacturing, marketing and sale of prescription drugs, and provides that 
a drug cannot be sold in interstate commerce unless it is approved by the FDA for the 
specific medical use, or ‘indication,’ listed on the drug’s labeling.”  In re Schering 
Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)).  Although “[p]rescription drugs frequently have therapeutic 
uses other than their FDA-approved indications[,] [t]he FDCA . . . generally prohibits 
manufacturers from marketing, advertising, or otherwise promoting drugs for such 
unapproved or ‘off-label’ uses.”   Id. at 239-40 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) and (d)). 
However, “[b]ecause the FDCA does not regulate the practice of medicine, physicians 
may lawfully prescribe drugs for off-label uses.”  Id. at 240 (citing Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)).  Furthermore, “violations of the 
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FDCA do not create private rights of action.”  Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 
540, 544 (3d Cir. 1994). 
II. ANALYSIS2  
 A. Plaintiffs’ Fraud Claims Are Not Pled with Sufficient Particularity Under 
 Rule 9(b) 
 
Plaintiffs’ claims are premised upon Cephalon’s allegedly fraudulent scheme to 
mislead doctors with respect to the proper use and effectiveness of Actiq and Fentora, 
thereby causing those doctors to improperly prescribe those drugs to Plaintiffs’ claimants.  
Because this theory sounds in fraud, Plaintiffs’ pleadings must satisfy the “stringent” 
Rule 9(b) requirements for particularity.3  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 200 
(3d Cir. 2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state 
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).  “In order to satisfy 
Rule 9(b), plaintiffs must plead with particularity ‘the “circumstances” of the alleged 
                                                            
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
dismissal of the Amended Complaint[],” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, 
sections (b)(1) and (b)(6).  Schering Plough, 678 F.3d at 243.  “We review the District 
Court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion, but 
we review the District Court’s underlying legal determinations de novo and factual 
determinations for clear error.”  Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).  
3 See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 717 (3d Cir. 1996) (Even when “fraud 
is not a necessary element of a claim . . .  claims that do sound in fraud must be pled with 
particularity.”).  Thus, all of Plaintiffs’ claims alleging fraudulent activity—i.e., 
Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment and 
an injunction—must be pled with sufficient particularity under Rule 9(b).  
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fraud in order to place the defendants on notice of the precise misconduct with which 
they are charged, and to safeguard defendants against spurious charges of immoral and 
fraudulent behavior.’”  Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984)),  
abrogated in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 
(2007).  “Plaintiffs also must allege who made a misrepresentation to whom and the 
general content of the misrepresentation.”  Id. at 224. 
 Here, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that Cephalon’s marketing and promotion 
of Actiq and Fentora were deceptive, improper, false or misleading do not satisfy that 
burden.4  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ argument boils down to an assertion that Cephalon’s off-
label promotion of Actiq and Fentora was inherently fraudulent and created a private 
cause of action.  However, Plaintiffs fail to identify any specific fraudulent statements, 
omissions, or misrepresentations that were made to doctors who prescribed Actiq and 
Fentora.  We agree with the District Court that Plaintiffs fail to allege “the contents of 
these statements and materials”5 and do not “specify when, where, or to whom any sales 
                                                            
4 Plaintiffs’ argument that the Rule 9(b) particularity requirements should be relaxed here 
because certain information was exclusively within Defendants’ control fails.  
Defendants did not have exclusive control over significant information, such as the 
reasons that the doctors prescribed Actiq and Fentora, or whether Plaintiffs’ claimants 
who received those prescriptions benefitted from them.  
5 The District Court noted that one document title provided by Plaintiffs, “Actiq for 
Migraine,” suggests the content of this document.  (App. 32, n. 18.)  This alone is 
insufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement.    
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pitch was made.”  (App. 32, n. 18.)  Because Plaintiffs have not alleged the particular 
facts surrounding the alleged fraud, as required under Rule 9(b), their claims sounding in 
fraud cannot stand.  Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of those claims.   
 B. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act6 
 The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under CUTPA on the grounds that 
Plaintiffs’ did not adequately establish a cognizable injury.  However, we will not reach 
the question of injury because even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs had established 
injury, they have failed to sufficiently plead causation, as required by CUTPA.  Thus, we 
will affirm for that reason.7  See Stevenson Lumber Co.-Suffield v. Chase Assocs., 932 
A.2d 401, 406 (Conn. 2007) (“[I]n order to prevail in a CUTPA action, a plaintiff must 
establish both that the defendant has engaged in a prohibited act and that, ‘as a result of’ 
this act, the plaintiff suffered an injury. The language ‘as a result of’ requires a showing 
that the prohibited act was the proximate cause of a harm to the plaintiff.” (quoting Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-110g)).  “Proximate cause is an actual cause that is a substantial 
factor in the resulting harm.”  Artie’s Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 
320, 330 (Conn. 2008) (alterations, citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
                                                            
6 The District Court held that because Plaintiffs did not plead facts alleging economic 
injury in any state besides Connecticut, CUTPA is the only consumer protection law 
under which Plaintiffs have standing.  On appeal, Plaintiffs have made no argument that 
their claims should have been considered under other states’ consumer protection laws, 
thus this argument is waived.  See Surrick, 338 F.3d at 237. 
7 “We may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by the record.”  Nicini v. 
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
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 Here, the allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to establish proximate cause.    
Indeed, Plaintiffs did not allege that any doctor relied on Defendants’ alleged 
misrepresentations in prescribing Actiq or Fentora, or that these prescriptions would not 
have been written if these physicians had not received the allegedly fraudulent 
information from Cephalon.  Thus, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded causation, as 
required by CUTPA, and we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the CUTPA 
claims. 
C. Amendment 
 Plaintiffs also appeal the District Court’s denial of their motion to partially amend 
the judgment of dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and for leave 
to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).  The District Court denied this motion 
because Plaintiffs had already filed one amended complaint and had discovery, the 
motion to dismiss had been pending for over a year, and the District Court had already 
heard argument on it.  The District Court found that Plaintiffs strategically delayed filing 
their SAC to see if their Amended Complaint survived Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.  
The District Court also reviewed the SAC and determined that it “fail[ed] to cure the 
deficiencies” that the District Court identified in dismissing the Amended Complaint.  
(App. 47.)  Thus, amendment would have been futile.  See In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Among the grounds that could justify a 
denial of leave to amend . . . [is] futility.”).  
 We agree that amendment would have been futile and will affirm on that ground.  
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Although Plaintiffs did include additional detail in the proposed SAC, such as 
information regarding conferences sponsored by Cephalon, and physician attendees who 
later prescribed Actiq, the SAC still fails to satisfy causation, which is a required element 
of each of Plaintiffs’ claims.  See Sturm v. Harb Dev., LLC, 2 A.3d 859, 872 (Conn. 
2010) (requiring party claiming intentional misrepresentation “‘to have suffered harm as 
a result of . . . reliance [on the false representation]’” (quoting Suffield Dev. Assocs. 
P’ship v. Nat’l Loan Investors, L.P., 802 A.2d 44 (Conn. 2002)); Platinum Funding 
Servs., LLC v. Petco Insulation Co., No. 3:09-CV-1133, 2011 WL 1743417, at *10 (D. 
Conn. May 2, 2011) (“A plaintiff asserting an unjust enrichment claim must show . . . 
that the plaintiff suffered a detriment as a result of the defendant’s failure to pay the 
plaintiff.”); Stevenson, 932 A.2d at 406 (requiring a showing of proximate causation 
under CUTPA).  Allegations that physicians attended presentations and interacted with 
Cephalon sales representatives do not sufficiently demonstrate that these interactions 
caused the physicians to write the prescriptions at issue.  Because the facts alleged in the 
SAC do not create a sufficient causal connection between Defendants’ alleged actions 
and the alleged injury suffered by Plaintiffs, amendment would have been futile.  Thus, 
we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment of 
dismissal and for leave to file an SAC.                                                                                                                                                                                                      
III. CONCLUSION  
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the final judgment of the District Court. 
 
